Major Power Rivalry and Wedge Strategy of Concessions
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071556 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Hankyeul Yang (Mitchell Institute, autor de correspondencia), Han‐Sul Yang (0000-0003-0171-688X, Texas A&M University) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Volumen | 70 |
| Número | 7-8 |
| Páginas | 1152-1182 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-02-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027261417327 |
| OpenAlex | W7128389301 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 81 |
Military alliances are an important feature of major power competition. One way for a major power to increase its relative power is to drive a wedge in a rival’s alliance. Why and when does a major power do so? I propose a theory of strategic opportunity, which holds that a major power seeks to drive a wedge in the rival’s alliance by offering economic aid to a rival’s protégé when that country experiences a rapid deterioration in its relations with its patron. I test my theory on major power rivalry dyads and find empirical support for my argument on a set of directed dyad-year observations between 1960 and 2010. The findings contribute to our understanding of alliance politics and strategic considerations behind using economic carrots in major power rivalry
Alliance · Argument (complex analysis · Economic power · Politics · Power (physics · Rivalry · Strategic alliance · Wedge (geometry · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |