Heidegger and Artificial Intelligence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10345356
AutoresBeth Preston (autor de correspondencia)
Año1993
Volumen53
Número1
Páginas43-43
Fecha de publicación1993-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2108053
OpenAlexW2316563202
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas8

Two decades ago Hubert Dreyfus launched a critique of AI which was largely inspired by the work of Martin Heidegger. He has continued to press this critique, but it has not served to stem the flood of computational enthusiasm even among philosophers, never mind among the practitioners of computation themselves. AI has become a flourishing academic industry, and the computational theory of mind is thriving in psychology and philosophy departments alike, under the rubric of cognitive science. Needless to say, few of the denizens of Al laboratories or of the multifarious strongholds of cognitive science are reading Heidegger. Nevertheless, I believe that ideas of importance to AI and to the computational theory of mind in general are to be gleaned from Heidegger. There is nothing in Heidegger to suggest that the project of constructing artificially intelligent creatures is impossible, or that mental processes cannot be construed as computational processes of some sort. What Heidegger does suggest is an alternative approach to the study of intelligent behavior in general; an approach which rejects some key assumptions of the computational theory of mind in its traditional cognitivist formulation. This paper has two main objectives. The first is to describe the alternative approach suggested by a reading of Heidegger. In doing this I will be distinguishing my interpretation of Heidegger from Dreyfus' interpretation. I do not think either Dreyfus' critique or his positive program are wrong-in fact they are eminently worthwhile so far as they go. But they are limited by an insufficiently radical interpretation of Heidegger which allows his potentially most significant contributions to the analysis of intelligent activity to remain undeveloped and unappreciated. So I will develop them, indicating along the way points of contact with existing work in Al and cognitive science, and sketch the methodological implications the adoption of the Heideggerian alternative would have for further research. The second obiective is to give some reasons for thinking that this alternative approach merits attention. This objective is accomplished in two

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Artificial Intelligence · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology