The Shape of the Kantian Mind

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10345488
AutoresT A Pendlebury (0000-0001-8950-9310, University of Pittsburgh, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen104
Número2
Páginas364-387
Fecha de publicación2021-03-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpr.12767
OpenAlexW3133946473
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas24

Kant's readers have disagreed about whether, according to his account of cognition, concepts, representations of the understanding, are involved in intuitions, representations of sensibility. But proponents of the affirmative 'conceptualist' answer and those of the negative 'non‐conceptualist' answer have alike presupposed that such involvement should be construed in a particular way: i.e., as the involvement of particular concepts in particular exercises of sensibility. I argue, on the contrary, that it should not be: that though, for Kant, no concepts are applied in exercises of sensibility, nonetheless the understanding, the faculty of concepts, is teleologically internal to sensibility and, therefore, to its exercises. That is, those exercises are per se directed towards the provision to the understanding of objects to which its fundamental concepts, the categories, are applicable, though no act of categorical application is internal to them. This conception of sensibility, available only in light of a careful distinction between capacities and acts, is demanded, I argue, by Kant's conception of a priori knowledge as elaborated in his Transcendental Deduction

A priori and a posteriori · Categorical imperative · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Morality · Political science · Sensibility · Transcendental number · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology