The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691286 |
|---|---|
| Autores | J Todd Buras (Yale University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2002 |
| Volumen | 52 |
| Número | 209 |
| Páginas | 457-477 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2002-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00280 |
| OpenAlex | W2084905915 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 8 |
There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind‐independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper
Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Perception · Realism · Sign (mathematics) · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,13 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2010 - 2014 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |