Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10694512
AutoresKeith Derose (autor de correspondencia)
Año1989
Volumen98
Número3
Páginas313
Fecha de publicación1989-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185022
OpenAlexW2319758790
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9

I wish to discuss Thomas Reid's defense of and case for realism with respect to mind-independent bodies (material objects). While Reid's realism has received a good deal of attention lately, what I believe to be the centerpiece of Reid's case for his realism his anti-sensationalist view of our concepts of bodies and their qualities-has been largely neglected. In what follows, I show the connection between Reid's anti-sensationalism and his realism, and I then critically assess Reid's anti-sensationalism. Reid's views are developed largely as a reaction to the views of Berkeley and Hume. It will be important, therefore, to examine some of the relevant aspects of these philosophers' thought and Reid's interpretation of them

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Media studies · Realism · Sensationalism · Sociology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil