Quantifier Variance, Ontological Pluralism and Ideal Languages

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691455
AutoresA Arturo Javier-Castellanos (0000-0003-3662-3149, Syracuse University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen69
Número275
Páginas277-293
Fecha de publicación2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy048
OpenAlexW2897071021
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas18

Kris McDaniel has recently defended a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that classifies the quantifier variantist as one. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. There is an important difference between the two views, which is sometimes obscured by a common view in the metaphysics of fundamentality. According to the simple analysis, a language is ideal—it allows for a maximally metaphysically perspicuous description of reality—just in case all its primitives are perfectly natural. I argue that this analysis struggles to distinguish quantifier variance from ontological pluralism, and then I discuss various accounts that can do better. I then propose a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that does not misclassify the quantifier variantist. Finally, I discuss some additional advantages of my proposal.

Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Mistake · Philosophy of language · Pluralism (philosophy) · Political science · Proposition · Quantifier (linguistics) · Simple (philosophy) · Variance (accounting) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science