Composition, identity and plural ontology

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10807253
AutoresRoberto Lo (0000-0003-3470-1799, Universität Hamburg, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen198
Número10
Páginas9193-9210
Fecha de publicación2021-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02628-w
OpenAlexW3013240119
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas38

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’ (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities

Epistemology · Identity (music) · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Ontology · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Plural · Quantifier (linguistics) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science