Desire and Satisfaction
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691507 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ashley Shaw (0000-0001-7559-3224, University College London, UK, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 70 |
| Número | 279 |
| Páginas | 371-384 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqz068 |
| OpenAlex | W2978974958 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 19 |
Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their own persistence’, a problem posed by Shieva Kleinschmidt, Kris McDaniel, and Ben Bradley. The solution undercuts a key motivation for rejecting the standard view in favour of more radical accounts proposed in the literature
Epistemology · Key (lock) · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |