The Authority of Desire
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10695792 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dennis W Stampe (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1987 |
| Volumen | 96 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 335 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1987-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185225 |
| OpenAlex | W2313300516 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 91 |
A ristotle said that the intellect itself moves nothing; not even I the thinker himself is moved by thought alone. But thinking which . . . aims at an end and is does issue in and rational motion. Such practical thought originates in the appetite, and such motions, therefore, begin in desire. (Hence choice is desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire . . . N.E. 1139b). But how is it possible for practical reasoning to begin in desire? That is perhaps the central question about practical reasoning. The central question about desire is the question how practical reasoning can begin in it.I
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Deliberating for Our Far Future Selves
Yu in the Xunzi
Motivational Humeanism 5
The Constructivist Challenge 2
The Justification of Moral Principles 11
The Theory of Motivating States
Moral Scepticism 10
Supervenience and Causation 4
Moral Rationalism 8
Acting for a Good Reason
Reasons and Desires
Reasons and Beliefs
Rationality and Disagreement 9
As I Believe
Consequential Matters
Reasons for Action
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs 12
Motivational Judgement Internalism 6
The Non-cognitivist Challenge 1
Reasons Internalism 7
Ethical Non-naturalism 3
How Many Explanations?
Knowledge and its Limits
The Transparency of Experience
Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance
How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value
Conceptualized and Unconceptualized Desire in Aristotle
Appearances and Calculations
Aristotle on Desire
Plato's Utopia Recast
Needs as Causes
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude
Foregrounding Desire
Nietzsche and value creation
Are there Passive Desires
Wanting and willing
Practical Reality
Moral Realism
The Self-Knowledge of Combinatory States
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good
Desire's Own Reasons
Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Action
Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy
The guise of good reason
Bernard Williams on the guise of the good
How to keep up good appearances
Representation in action
What is the attitude of desire
Living well in extended reality
Do emotions represent values and how can we tell
Hunger, homeostasis, and desire
Underspecifying desires
Direction of Fit Accounts of Propositional Attitudes
The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear
The guise of the good in the story of one's life
Do affective desires provide reasons for action
An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure
Aesthetic knowledge
Reasons and ‘because’
By the Devil’s Own Lights
Desire and What It’s Rational to Do
The Moral Universe
The Retreat of Reason
Emotional introspection
Is Perception a Source of Reasons
Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism
On Practical Abduction
Motivation to the Means
The Varieties of Molecular Explanation
Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good
A Hedonic Subjectivism
The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire
Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life
Reasons for Belief
Policy Externalism
Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game
Not Only a Messenger
Desire and Goodness
Against Strong Cognitivism
T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good
The distinction between desires and intentions
A puzzle about desire
Urges
Desire and Satisfaction
Emotional Depth
Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good
Hope
Against Strong Cognitivism
Desires and Practical Judgments in Action
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
| Obras citantes distintas | 91 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,84 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 91 |