The guise of good reason
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21702829 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ulf Hlobil (0000-0002-5072-9380, Concordia University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 24 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 204-224 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-05-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908577 |
| OpenAlex | W3146589310 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 58 |
The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I end by arguing that this version of the Guise of the Good withstands standard objections
Deductive reasoning · Epistemology · Inference · Practical reason · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
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Goodness and Desire
Desiring the Bad
What is inference?
Título no disponible
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Practical Shape
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Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good
The Possibility of Practical Reason
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Reasoning without regress
The Nature of Inference
The Authority of Desire
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons
The Undesirable & the Adesirable
Reasons without Rationalism
What is a reason to act
Inference
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,25 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |