Are there Passive Desires

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8085339
AutoresDavid G Wall (0000-0001-9359-9822, autor de correspondencia), David Wall (0000-0001-5706-8151)
Año2009
Volumen63
Número2
Páginas133-155
Fecha de publicación2009-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
Revistadialectica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0012-2017 • E-ISSN: 1746-8361
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01187.x
OpenAlexW2054799441
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas29

What is the relation between desire and action? According to a traditional, widespread and influential view I call ‘The Motivational Necessity of Desire’ (MN) having a desire that p entails being disposed to act in ways you believe will bring about p. But what about desires like a desire that the committee chooses you without your needing to do anything, or a desire that your child passes her exams on her own? Such ‘self-passive’ desires are often given as a counter example to MN. If MN is true then self-passive desires seem absurd: if someone has a self-passive desire she will be disposed to act, thereby preventing her from getting what she desires. But it seems we can reasonably, and often do, have such desires. However, I argue that self-passive desires are not, in fact, counter-examples to MN: close consideration of the content of these desires, the contexts in which we ascribe them, and what is claimed by MN shows that they are not a problem for that view. I also argue that strengthened versions of the examples are unsuccessful, and I offer a diagnosis of why these kinds of case are commonly thought to raise a challenge to MN

Epistemology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy