Vouchers and Public Policy
When Ideology Trumps Evidence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11367271 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Clive Belfield (0000-0003-2556-7540, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia), Henry M Levin (0000-0003-2729-9615, Columbia University) |
| Año | 2005 |
| Volumen | 111 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 548-567 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | American Journal of Education (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0195-6744 • E-ISSN: 1549-6511 |
| Editorial | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/431183 |
| OpenAlex | W2174826415 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 19 |
| Referencias citadas | 21 |
The economic model of education policy assumes that there is a substantial consensus on educational goals among constituencies and that the major challenge is to determine the most effective strategies for reaching those goals. Unfortunately, the debate over educational vouchers is complicated by the presence of multiple and competing goals, and mixed and ambiguous evidence. The result is that differences in conclusions on the effectiveness of vouchers largely mirror interpretations that are conditioned heavily by competing ideologies rather than straightforward facts. The primary conflict is between what we term “libertarian” and “social contract” positions. Libertarians believe that freedom of choice should be the highest priority of voucher reforms and assume that a private marketplace with increased options will promote greater efficiency and (possibly) equity. Advocates for a social contract maintain that education generates important positive externalities that are best promoted through a free, publicly funded and operated and democratically determined educational system. This work contends that evaluations must openly acknowledge such competing beliefs and preferences for particular goals rather than simply attributing their views to the “facts.” Our framework allows policy makers to predict outcomes and understand the trade‐offs among goals that choice reforms entail, even in the presence of limited or ambiguous evidence
Economics · Educational Equity · Equity (law · Externality · Ideology · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public economics · Public good · Public relations · School choice · Sociology · Voucher · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · School Choice and Performance
La economía política de la privatización educativa
Money, Vouchers, Public Infrastructures? A Framework for Sustainable Welfare Benefits
Choice and competition in education
The “Developing” Achievement Gap
The Institutional Landscape of Interest Group Politics and School Choice
Reimagining Critical Theory
Choice and competition in education
Designing Targeted Educational Voucher Schemes for the Poor in Developing Countries
Does Market Competition Encourage Strategic Action in the Private Education Sector
Multiple paths towards education privatization in a globalizing world
School Choice
Educational Vouchers and Social Cohesion
Race and School Vouchers
Comparative Educational Pluralism
A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Shelby County School District’s Voluntary Preschool Program
Private Schools and the Parents that Choose Them
The Civic Dimension of School Voucher Programs
Perceptions of Racialized Opportunities and Hispanics' Political Attitudes
Marché scolaire, stratification des établissements et inégalités d'accès à l'université au québec
Choosing Schools
Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia
Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement
How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production
Cultural Literacy
Is There “White Flight” into Private Schools? Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey
Peer effects in private and public schools across countries
Educational vouchers
The Public-Private Nexus in Education
Another Look at the New York City School Voucher Experiment
Inefficiency, Subsample Selection Bias, and Nonrobustness
Efficiency, Bias, and Classification Schemes
| Obras citantes distintas | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,9 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2005 - 2024 (20) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 18 |