Ownership, empowerment, and productivity
Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11680287 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Laura I Langbein, Laura Langbein (0000-0003-3899-1543, American University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2000 |
| Volumen | 19 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 427-449 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2000-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0276-8739 • E-ISSN: 1520-6688 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/1520-6688(200022)19:3<427::aid-pam4>3.0.co;2-2 |
| OpenAlex | W1975583837 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 14 |
| Referencias citadas | 26 |
This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid- and top-level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show that disagreement among important and attentive proximate principals (mid-level managers) expands discretion, but disagreement among important and attentive distant principals (top executives and politicians) reduces discretion. Sector has no direct or indirect effect on discretion. When customers or clients and peers are important and attentive principals, discretion increases, and so does productivity. Monitoring by mid-level management has no effect on productivity. Because disagreement among distant principals is greater in the public sector, devolution of authority alone is unlikely to increase public sector productivity. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
Business · Devolution (biology · Discretion · Economic growth · Economics · Empirical evidence · Empowerment · Labour economics · Political science · Private sector · Productivity · Public economics · Public relations · Public sector · Sociology · Accounting and Organizational Management · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Does political corruption reduce pro‐social behavior by bureaucrats? Lab experimental evidence from Bangladesh
Factors Affecting Planned Unit Development Implementation
Making contribution analysis work
Exploring the Impact of Community and Organizational Social Capital on Government Performance
Productivity in the Workplace
Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats
Capturer les effets de contexte depuis le guichet. Une analyse multiniveau de la fabrique des discriminations
Explaining implementation behaviour of the National Incident Management System (Nims)
Empowering Public Sector Employees to Improve Performance
Macro Implementation
Employee Empowerment, Employee Attitudes, and Performance
Taking a Closer Look at the Empowerment‐Performance Relationship
The Role of Political Ideology in the Structural Design of New Governance Agencies
Organizational social capital, structure and performance
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Managerial Dilemmas
Unidimensional Scaling
Working, Shirking, and Sabotage
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Corporate culture and economic theory
Red Tape and Task Delays in Public and Private Organizations
Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements
Bureaucratic Dynamics
Matching Responsibilities with Tactics
Management Control and the Pentagon
Reconciling Public Entrepreneurship and Democracy
Power and Administration
The Proverbs of Administration
Pay, Productivity, and the Public Sector
"Organizational Rules and the "Bureaucratic Personality
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
Democratic Control and Bureaucratic Responsiveness
Political Control of Implementation Agencies
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Political Control Versus Expertise
| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,64 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2004 - 2024 (21) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 12 |