In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID19035337
AutoresTim Bayne (0000-0001-8591-7907, autor de correspondencia), Elisabeth Pacherie (0000-0003-2337-581X, autor de correspondencia)
Año2005
Volumen20
Número2
Páginas163-188
Fecha de publicación2005-03-24
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaMind & Language (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00281.x
OpenAlexW2041346038
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas45
Referencias citadas33

In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Delusion · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Metacognition · Psychiatry · Psychoanalysis · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment