Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20053864
AutoresSacha Golob (0000-0001-9803-3430, King's College London, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Páginas27-52
Fecha de publicación2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoCHAPTER
RevistaKantian Nonconceptualism (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-53517-7_2
OpenAlexW2484446399
ISBN9781137535177
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas24

One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this chapter, Golob argues that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, Golob discusses in detail how and why his reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. He suggests that ultimately it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume

Epistemology · Linguistics · Transcendental number · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science