Flat Physicalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20143091
AutoresMeir Hemmo (0000-0002-0752-1269, University of Haifa Haifa Israel), Orly Shenker (0000-0001-5716-6894, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem Israel, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen88
Número4
Páginas743-764
Fecha de publicación2022-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12396
OpenAlexW4220978929
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9
Referencias citadas40

This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism , and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ‘physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations

Epistemology · Identity (music) · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Realisation · Advanced Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications