Lies in Art

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293472
AutoresDaisy Dixon (0000-0002-7781-282X, University of Cambridge, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen100
Número1
Páginas25-39
Fecha de publicación2022-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1844772
OpenAlexW3108864813
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas19

This paper aims to show that any account of how artworks lie must acknowledge (I) that artworks can lie at different levels of their content—what I call ‘surface’ and ‘deep’—and (II) that, for an artwork to lie at a given level, a norm of truthful communication such as Grice’s Maxim of Quality must apply to it. A corollary is that it’s harder than you might think for artworks to lie: Quality is not automatically ‘switched on’ during our engagement with art. However, I show how a work’s curation and genre-membership can ‘switch on’ Quality, allowing artworks to lie at different levels

Aesthetics · Art · Corollary · Epistemology · Grice · Linguistics · Maxim · Norm (philosophy) · Pure mathematics · Quality (philosophy) · Sociology · Work of art · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual Culture and Art Theory