Fictions that don’t tell the truth

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21370786
AutoresNeri Marsili (0000-0001-7853-7359, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen181
Número5
Páginas1025-1046
Fecha de publicación2024-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-024-02098-7
OpenAlexW4395463865
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas70

Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article introduces two views that support a positive answer, and two that support a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie

Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment