Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21364075
AutoresH Orri Stefánsson (0000-0002-8382-1802, Stockholm University Stockholm Sweden, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen58
Número2
Páginas536-561
Fecha de publicación2024-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12470
OpenAlexW4378904932
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas46

Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts

Actuarial science · Economics · Epistemology · Harm · Lottery · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology