From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10695757
AutoresTim Henning (0000-0002-0704-8651, University of Stuttgart, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen124
Número2
Páginas169-206
Fecha de publicación2015-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2842176
OpenAlexW1816433876
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas21
Referencias citadas33

Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consent account, and argues that none of these strategies succeed. The article then discusses and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a lottery, as opposed to simply picking one of the parties on more subjective grounds or out of pure whim. In addition to the practical consequences of this skeptical view, the article sketches some theoretical implications for debates about saving the greater number and about axiomatic utilitarianism

Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Lottery · Microeconomics · Normative · Positive economics · Skepticism · Utilitarianism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment