Entitled to Embezzlement? The Case of Successful Executives Working for Rich Heirs

Datos Bibliográficos

ID2153241
AutoresPetter Gottschalk (0000-0002-8120-0308, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway, autor de correspondencia), Cecilie Asting (BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway)
Año2020
Volumen41
Número3
Páginas269-277
Fecha de publicación2020-03-03
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaDeviant Behavior (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0163-9625 • E-ISSN: 1521-0456
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01639625.2018.1564365
OpenAlexW2907503043
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas30

In family firms, there is a distinction between family members and nonfamily members. Research reviewed in this article indicates that family firms tend to be operated to enhance the well-being of owning families and their members. Nonfamily executives are often treated as second-class individuals in the organization. There is an asymmetrical distribution of power among family and nonfamily. From the theory of convenience, we apply equity theory in the motivational dimension, principal–agent theory in the opportunity dimension, and neutralization theory in the willingness dimension to shed light on deviant behaviors by nonfamily executives in family firms. We present two case studies from Norway – a former CEO and a former CFO in family firms – who both were sentenced to prison for embezzlement

Business · Corporate governance · Criminal law · Criminology · Demographic economics · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · Embezzlement · Equity (law · Political science · Principal–agent problem · Prison · Corporate Finance and Governance · Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences · Family Business Performance and Succession · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology · Finance

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