Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21702811
AutoresSergio Tenenbaum (0000-0002-5449-7513, University of Toronto, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen24
Número1
Páginas75-92
Fecha de publicación2021-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869795.2020.1868116
OpenAlexW3120281240
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas24

Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis (GG), he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only pursue what we conceive to be good. This version of thesis seems to allow that human beings might act in defiance of reason’s directives, and that if they did so, they would not necessarily be engaging in actions that they conceive to be good in any way. In fact, Kant’s discussions of pathological motivation and his understanding of imperatives seem to preclude any stronger reading. Despite this evidence, many interpreters, relying on Kant’s discussion of self-conceit and the ‘incorporation thesis’, assume that Kant’s commitment to GG extends to all actions; on this interpretation, even immoral actions are pursued under the guise of the good. I argue that the reasoning typically provided in favor of this interpretation is neither compatible with Kant’s hedonism regarding non-moral motives nor with his commitment to the epistemic priority of our awareness of moral law over our awareness of freedom. However, the textual evidence that Kant accepted a more extensive version of GG is indeed compelling. I propose that Kant holds the stronger version of GG on distinctively moral grounds; the nature of our awareness of the moral law implies that evil is pursued under the guise of the good

Autonomy · Categorical imperative · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Moral philosophy · Morality · Political science · Practical philosophy · Practical reason · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification