Kant's Empirical Hedonism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 8089698 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Andrew B Johnson (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2005 |
| Volumen | 86 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 50-63 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005-02-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00214.x |
| OpenAlex | W1973953944 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath's popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, and his revisionist interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence
Autonomy · Epistemology · Happiness · Hedonism · Heteronomy · Interpretation (philosophy · Political science · Teleology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,75 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2024 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 6 |