Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8097580
AutoresMarkus Kohl (0000-0001-9082-8490, Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, autor de correspondencia)
Año2018
Volumen99
Número3
Páginas489-516
Fecha de publicación2018-06-11
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papq.12226
OpenAlexW2807828937
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas27

I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori , objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative‐practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non‐moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency

A priori and a posteriori · Agency (philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Categorical imperative · Epistemology · Moral agency · Morality · Normative · Practical reason · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy