The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 24061981 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Daphna Lewinsohn‐Zamir (0000-0002-4460-2076, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2012 |
| Volumen | 168 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 5-26 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2012-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Editorial | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245612799440014 |
| OpenAlex | W2093134836 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
The doctrine of efficient breach is based on the belief that the risk of postcontractual bargaining failure under property rules is greater than the risk of the courts' miscalculation of damages under liability rules. The article presents the findings of two experiments that challenge this belief and suggest that courts systematically undercompensate promisees. Implementation of the efficient-breach doctrine might therefore lead to underdeterrence and inefficiency.
Doctrine · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Computer Science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Legal principles and applications
| Citas por año | 0,2 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Altamente citado | No |