Unpacking the dynamics of a contested practice
The case of executive compensation and the shareholder value orientation in the USA
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3186653 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Edward J Carberry (University of Massachusetts Boston, autor de correspondencia), Edward J Zajac (0000-0002-4453-7147, Northwestern University) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 19 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 157-187 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-07-14 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Socio-Economic Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1475-1461 • E-ISSN: 1475-147X |
| DOI | 10.1093/ser/mwaa026 |
| OpenAlex | W3082648580 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 79 |
The corporate scandals and market crashes of the 2000s generated significant criticism of the shareholder value orientation (SVO) in the USA. We offer a sociopolitical analysis of how this criticism triggered changes in stock-based executive compensation, a central practice associated with the SVO. We first analyze how corporate stakeholders redefined different forms of stock-based compensation, motivated new regulations and wielded direct challenges to specific firms. We then predict how firm-specific differences in external challenges and intra-firm power relationships were related to changes in the use of stock options and restricted stock grants (RSGs), testing our predictions using a longitudinal dataset of S&P 500 executives between 2002 and 2012. We find that firms facing negative media coverage of their executive compensation practices made less use of both forms of stock-based compensation, while firms facing shareholder activism only made less use of stock options, the form that was more heavily criticized. In addition, firms with more powerful CEOs utilized RSGs more heavily and did so even when facing media criticism. Our findings demonstrate that while stock options were vulnerable to change, stock-based compensation remained resilient because the structural power of CEOs, a core corporate governance feature of the SVO, also remained resilient
Business · Compensation (psychology · Corporate governance · Criticism · Executive compensation · Political science · Shareholder · Shareholder value · Stock (firearms · Stock market · Unpacking · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting · Psychology · Accounting · Finance · Law · Social Psychology
The Architecture of Markets
Media Legitimation Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings.
Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
A General Theory of Organizational Stigma
Institutional Complexity and Organizational Responses
Institutional Sources of Boundary-Spanning Structures
Theory of the firm
Shaping the shareholder activism agenda
Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility
The rise of activist investors and patterns of political responses
The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism
Social Movements, Risk Perceptions, and Economic Outcomes
Anglo-American corporate governance and the employment relationship
The financial crisis in the US 2008-2009
A Dynamic Process Model of Private Politics
Institutional investors, corporate elites and the building of a market for corporate control
Through the Contested Terrain
Financial markets as production markets
Crisis in the regulation regime--a new paradigm
Making sense of financialization
Financialization and the institutional foundations of the new capitalism
Taking capitalism seriously
The financialization of the American economy
The Contentiousness of Markets
Compensation Benchmarking, Leapfrogs, and the Surge in Executive Pay
Maximizing shareholder value
| Citas por año | 1 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Altamente citado | No |