Centralized Collective Bargaining and the Problem of 'Compliance

Lessons from the Italian Experience

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3265679
AutoresLucio Baccaro (0000-0001-6410-6179, Case Western Reserve University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2000
Volumen53
Número4
Páginas579-601
Fecha de publicación2000-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/001979390005300402
OpenAlexW2129888428
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas29

According to the neo-corporatist approach to the "problem of compliance," worker control over union policy is incompatible with centralized wage regulation, because only associations in which national leaders are insulated from their members are capable of delivering rank-and-file acceptance of wage moderation. This analysis of centralized collective bargaining agreements in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s provides a critical re-examination of the traditional neo-corporatist approach. The author, drawing on archival research and interviews, argues that centralization can be entirely compatible with decision-making procedures in which rank-and-file workers have ultimate decision-making power. In fact, the Italian labor movement's adoption of more "democratic" decision-making procedures, he claims, was instrumental in generating and sustaining centralized collective bargaining arrangements in Italy in the early 1990s

Bargaining power · Business · Collective bargaining · Compliance (psychology) · Control (management) · Democracy · Economics · Labour economics · Management · Microeconomics · Moderation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Rank (graph theory) · Wage · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Legal and Labor Studies · Psychology · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Social Psychology