Negotiating the Italian Pension Reform with the Unions

Lessons for Corporatist Theory

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3268290
AutoresLucio Baccaro (0000-0001-6410-6179, International Labour Organization, autor de correspondencia)
Año2002
Volumen55
Número3
Páginas413
Fecha de publicación2002-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2696049
OpenAlexW3121837629
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas23
Referencias citadas27

Using field research at both the national and the local levels, the author reconstructs the process that led to pension reform in Italy. This reconstruction becomes the basis for a critical re-examination of corporatist theory, which has recently been challenged by the emergence of social pacts in a host of "unlikely" countries, including Italy. The author argues that the theory's traditional emphasis on hierarchical and internally undemocratic interest groups is fundamentally at odds with the particular organizational mechanisms through which consensus was mobilized among both middle-level union structures and rank-and-file workers in Italy. In contrast with standard neo-corporatist theory, the Italian pension reform shows that organizational democracy, far from weakening the hands of reformist union leaders, may actually strengthen them

Business · Corporatism · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Negotiation · Pension · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social democracy · Social security · Sociology · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies