Are objective chances compatible with determinism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079062 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sarah Bradley (0000-0001-9663-7919, Tilburg University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 12 |
| Número | 8 |
| Páginas | e12430 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12430 |
| OpenAlex | W2743931204 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 33 |
We review the question of whether objective chances are compatible with determinism. We first outline what we mean by chance and what we mean by determinism. We then look at the alleged incompatibility between those concepts. Finally, we look at some ways that one might attempt to overcome the incompatibility
Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Probability and Statistical Research · Psychology
A Primer on Determinism
Laws and Symmetry
The Third Way on Objective Probability
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science
The Dappled World
Determinism and Chance
Laws and chances in statistical mechanics
Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent
Deterministic probability
Probability and Determinism
The Dome
David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Emergent Chance
What Are the New Implications of Chaos for Unpredictability
What Chances Could Not Be
The Propensity Interpretation of Probability
Deterministic Chance
Varieties of Propensity
Chance, Possibility, and Explanation
Deterministic Chance
Randomness Is Unpredictability
The Big Bad Bug
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,6 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |