The Psychology of Scientific Explanation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4772908
AutoresJ D Trout (Loyola University Chicago, autor de correspondencia)
Año2007
Volumen2
Número3
Páginas564-591
Fecha de publicación2007-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00081.x
OpenAlexW2054622147
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas22
Referencias citadas51

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Psychological research · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology