The Instrumental Value of Explanations
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 4977848 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tania Lombrozo (0000-0001-5637-1431, University of California System, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Volumen | 6 |
| Número | 8 |
| Páginas | 539-551 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00413.x |
| OpenAlex | W1903964690 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 28 |
| Referencias citadas | 45 |
Scientific and 'intuitive' or 'folk' theories are typically characterized as serving three critical functions: prediction, explanation, and control. While prediction and control have clear instrumental value, the value of explanation is less transparent. This paper reviews an emerging body of research from the cognitive sciences suggesting that the process of seeking, generating, and evaluating explanations in fact contributes to future prediction and control, albeit indirectly by facilitating the discovery and confirmation of instrumentally valuable theories. Theoretical and empirical considerations also suggest why explanations may nonethelessfeelintrinsically valuable. The paper concludes by considering some implications of the psychology of explanation for a naturalized philosophy of explanation
Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Computer Science · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
The cultural roots of free will beliefs
Some Empirical Results Concerning Causal Learning and Representation
Invariance
Invariance Applied
The Normative and the Descriptive
Proportionality
Experimental Results Concerning Invariance
Methods for Investigating Causal Cognition
Theories of Causation
What do we want from Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A stakeholder perspective on XAI and a conceptual model guiding interdisciplinary XAI research
Relative explainability and double standards in medical decision-making
The future of artificial intelligence at work
Expressivism about explanatory relevance
On the Value of Reformulating
Mind the gap
No brute facts
Revisiting the narrow latent scope bias in explanatory reasoning
Children selectively endorse speculative conjectures
The explanation-polarisation model
Comparing Gender Hierarchy and Evolutionary Psychology Explanations of Workplace Sexual Harassment
Nullius in Explanans
Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making
AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy
Reading Skill Moderates the Impact of Semantic Similarity and Causal Specificity on the Coherence of Explanations
Learning From Refutation and Standard Expository Science Texts
Data science and molecular biology
Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value
Disciplining Deliberation
The Scientific Image
Words, Thoughts, and Theories
Teleological Explanations
Inference to the Best Explanation
Explanatory coherence
The misunderstood limits of folk science
Eliciting Self‐Explanations Improves Understanding
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
The structure and function of explanations
Causal–explanatory pluralism
The psychology of interpersonal relations.
Explanatory coherence in social explanations
Reintroducing Prediction to Explanation
Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Thinking about Mechanisms
The Inference to the Best Explanation
Occam's rattle
Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment
The scientific image
Effects of explanation and counterexplanation on the development and use of social theories
Explaining the evidence
Explanation and Understanding
The Psychology of Scientific Explanation
Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment
| Obras citantes distintas | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,33 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 27 |