The Male Marital Wage Premium

Sorting Vs. Differential Pay

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4937293
AutoresTrond Petersen (University of California, Berkeley), Andrew M Penner (0000-0002-9483-8933, University of California, Berkeley), Geir Høgsnes (University of Oslo)
Año2011
Volumen64
Número2
Páginas283-304
Fecha de publicación2011-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaIndustrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/001979391106400204
OpenAlexW1531331164
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas25
Referencias citadas38

The authors examine whether male marital and parenthood premia arise due to differential pay by employers or from differential sorting of employees on occupations and establishments. They investigate these premia using matched employee-employer data from the period 1979-96 in Norway, a country with increased pressures on men to be more active in the family sphere and in which public policy has aimed at remaking the family institution. We find that the effect of marriage, and to a lesser extent of children, occurs mostly through sorting on occupations and occupation-establishment units. The role of differential pay from employers is marginal in explaining the marital and parenthood premia. Results assessing within-individual changes in wages suggest that about 80% of the marital premium is due to selection. The men who eventually marry and/or have children sort into the higher-paying occupations and occupation-establishment units even prior to marriage and parenthood

Demographic economics · Differential (mechanical device) · Differential effects · Economics · Hourly wage · Labour economics · Marital status · Population · Sociology · Sorting · Wage · Demography · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Medicine · Retirement, Disability, and Employment