The Cooptation Dilemma
Explaining US Contestation of the Liberal Trade Order
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6146832 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tim Heinkelmann‐wild (0000-0003-2699-6048, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Andreas Kruck (0000-0002-2145-9326, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Bernhard Zangl (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) |
| Año | 2024 |
| Volumen | 4 |
| Número | 2 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2024-04-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Global Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 2634-3797 • E-ISSN: 2634-3797 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isagsq/ksae024 |
| OpenAlex | W4395450418 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 15 |
| Referencias citadas | 18 |
While the United States (US) acted as a liberal hegemon in setting up the Liberal International Order (LIO), it is increasingly contesting the inclusive legacy institutions underpinning the LIO and is instead moving towards alternative, more exclusive institutions. Why is the US contesting the institutions it once set up to stabilize the LIO? We argue that hegemonic contestation is the result of a reactive sequence that is endogenous to cooptation-based orders where hegemons face a trade-off between inclusion and control. This Cooptation Dilemma is particularly pronounced in strongly institutionalized liberal (sub-)orders, such as the international trade regime. It unfolds in three stages: Privileging control, the liberal hegemon first creates exclusive institutions, which are likely to breed contestation by excluded states. To tame their contestation, the hegemon secondly includes previously excluded states into the order, making the previously exclusive institutions more and more inclusive. To compensate for the related control loss, the hegemon finally promotes alternative, more exclusive institutions, successively turning away from the inclusive legacy institutions. We demonstrate this reactive sequence by tracing the process that led to the US contestation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our findings suggest that cooptation-based orders in general and strongly institutionalized liberal orders in particular are prone to dynamic instability
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · European Union Policy and Governance · Global trade and economics · World Trade Organization Law · Philosophy
Contestation of International Organizations
Discontent, voice, and loyalty
Between compliance and capitulation
Cooptation in great power rivalries
The quest for leadership in multilateral institutions
How informal intergovernmental organizations facilitate cooptation and promote peaceful change in times of power rivalry
Between collapse, integration and co-transformation
The Institutional Dynamics of Global Governance in Hard Times
The Twofold Relevance of International Law in Transitional Orders
World Ordering from the Margins
Pivotal power of small states to save the international liberal economic order
Discursive and behavioural sources of regime erosion
Insuring the Weak
Contestation in a World of Liberal Orders
Hierarchy and Endogenous Contestation in the Liberal International Order
State Power and the Structure of International Trade
An Exclusive Country Club
Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes
Competence versus control
Decompensating domestically
Historical Institutionalism in International Relations
Populism in Place
America and Trade Liberalization
A world economy restored
Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order
Contestations of the Liberal International Order
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the Gatt/WTO
Contestation in a World of Liberal Orders
The International Refugee Regime and the Liberal International Order
Contestation and Resilience in the Liberal International Order
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime as a “Failed Promise
The three pillars of stability
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics
| Citas por año | 7,5 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Altamente citado | No |