Interbranch Negotiations over Policies with Multiple Outcomes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6229455
AutoresWilliam G Howell (0000-0003-1733-2127, University of Chicago, autor de correspondencia), Saul P Jackman (Vanderbilt University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2013
Volumen57
Número4
Páginas956-970
Fecha de publicación2013-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12027
OpenAlexW1912846436
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas41

Whereas presidents represent the entire nation, members of Congress serve districts and states. Consequently, presidents and members of Congress often disagree not only about the merits of different policies but also about the criteria used to assess them. To investigate the relevance of jurisdictional−and by extension criterial−differences for policymaking, we revisit classic models of bargaining under uncertainty. Rather than define uncertainty about the mapping of one policy into one outcome, as all previous scholars have done, we allow for every policy to generate two politically relevant outcomes, one local and another national. We then identify equilibria in which the president's utility is increasing in the value that a representative legislator assigns to national outcomes. As an application of this theory, we analyze budgetary politics in war and peace. We find that during periods of war, when members of Congress assign greater importance to the very same national outcomes that preoccupy presidents, congressional appropriations more closely reflect presidential proposals

Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Outcome (game theory · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public economics · Relevance (law · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration