Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6300746
AutoresD Roderick Kiewiet (California Institute of Technology), Mathew D Mccubbins (0000-0003-0606-2109, Duke University)
Año1985
Volumen10
Número2
Páginas181
Fecha de publicación1985-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/439723
OpenAlexW1999733979
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas21

In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between a reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectation that the two sides jointly pursue a strategy of accommodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence both executive and legislative appropriations decisions

Action (physics · Economics · Executive branch · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Public Administration