Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6231036 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daniel Carpenter (0000-0002-5694-3927, Harvard University Press), Michael M Ting (0000-0002-1144-346X, Columbia University) |
| Año | 2007 |
| Volumen | 51 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 835-852 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2007-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00284.x |
| OpenAlex | W2121654690 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 21 |
| Referencias citadas | 20 |
How do a regulator's decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients? We develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better‐informed firm. The firm can perform publicly observable experiments to generate product information prior to submission. We find that when experimentation is short, Type I errors (approving bad products) are more likely for products submitted by firms with lower experimentation costs (larger firms), while Type II errors (rejecting good products) should be concentrated among smaller firms. These comparative statics are reversed when experimentation is long. We perform a statistical analysis on FDA approvals of new pharmaceutical products using two different measures of Type I error. We find consistent support for the counterintuitive hypothesis that, under particular conditions, errors are decreasing in the size of the firm submitting the product
Business · Comparative statics · Counterintuitive · Econometrics · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Political science · Product (mathematics · Product type · Regulator · Statistics · Type I and type II errors · Veto · Biosimilars and Bioanalytical Methods · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy · Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare
Inhibitory Institutions
Consumption Ethics
Regulatory Context and Bureaucratic Policy Making
Do vehicle recalls reduce the number of accidents? The case of the U.S. car market
Rule versus Discretion
The Regulation and Self-Regulation of a Complex Industry
Promoting Agency Reputation through Public Advice
Mechanisms of regulatory capture
Approval regulation and endogenous consumer confidence
The dynamics of doping
Recruitment by Petition
Organizational Reputations and the Observability of Public Warnings in 10 Pharmaceutical Markets
The Captive or the Broker? Explaining Public Agency–Interest Group Interactions
Bureaucratic Politics
Is Health Politics Different
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors
Politics and Administration
Legislatures, Bureaucracies, and Distributive Spending
Whistleblowing
Latecomers' Isomorphic R&D Strategy and the Relationship With Performance
Parallel Systems
Investment under Uncertainty
Essence of Decision
Reputation and legislative leadership
An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation
Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap
The Perfect is the Enemy of the Best
Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval
A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy
Essence of Decision
Protection without Capture
Reputation and Hegemonic Stability
| Obras citantes distintas | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,17 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 20 |