For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6232383
AutoresRebecca L Perlman (Princeton University), Rebecca Perlman (0000-0002-0176-3988, Princeton University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen64
Número2
Páginas293-308
Fecha de publicación2020-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12450
OpenAlexW2960647120
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas23

Science is central to the regulation of risk. But who provides the science on which risk regulations are based? Through an in‐depth empirical analysis of domestic health and safety standards, this article shows how private actors use scientific information to acquire preferential outcomes. I develop a formal model delineating conditions under which firms will seek stricter standards on their own products, and I reveal how companies can acquire these outcomes through the strategic provision of information. To test the theory, I track changes to U.S. agrochemical standards over a two‐decade period. I also introduce firm‐level petition data and historical evidence to test the mechanism directly. My findings provide new insight into the strategies companies use to benefit from regulations, while also forcing us to reevaluate what it means for regulations to be based on science

Business · Economics · Forcing (mathematics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Political science · Private information retrieval · Profit (economics · Public relations · Test (biology · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Regulation and Compliance Studies