A Model of Endogenous Government Formation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6231050
AutoresAnna Bassi (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Anna Maria Bassi (0000-0002-4633-4298, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, autor de correspondencia)
Año2013
Volumen57
Número4
Páginas777-793
Fecha de publicación2013-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12031
OpenAlexW1498077047
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas28
Referencias citadas41

Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalition in support of Gamson's Law of portfolio allocation. This article examines government formation as a process in which both the government coalition and the formateur are determined endogenously. In equilibrium, if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios, the share of seats they are allocated is proportional to the parties’ sizes

Business · Cabinet (room · Christian ministry · Coalition government · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Multi-party system · Political science · Politics · Portfolio · Portfolio allocation · Public economics · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration