Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 23347828 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Michael Suk‐young Chwe (University of Chicago, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1994 |
| Volumen | 63 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 299-325 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1994-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Economic Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0531 • E-ISSN: 1095-7235 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1006/jeth.1994.1044 |
| OpenAlex | W1581606349 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 67 |
Economics · Game theory · Generalization · Independent set · Limit (mathematics) · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Political science · Set (abstract data type) · Social choice theory · Solution concept · Stability (learning theory) · Von Neumann architecture · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Theoretical Computer Science
Stable and Farsighted Set of Networks
Coalitional Stability of Multi-Party Systems
To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare
Nash bargaining is implementable via two-stage rights structures
The Last Will Be First, and the First Last
On perfect pairwise stable networks
Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations
Expectation Formation Rules and the Core of Partition Function Games
Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations
Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations
Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Social distance and network structures
Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good Industries
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare
Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
Myopic and Farsighted Stable Sets in 2-Player Strategic-Form Games
Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations
Making and breaking coalitions
Matching markets with farsighted couples
Formation of teams in contests
Committees under qualified majority rules
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
The Coase Theorem and the empty core
Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks
Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation
Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights
Multilateral War Bargaining
District coordination versus party consolidation
On the Stability of Group Formation
Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the Emu
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions
Coalitional Power and Public Goods
The stability set as a social choice correspondence
Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
On coalition formation
Which acceptable agreements are equilibria
Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets
Farsightedly stable tariffs
Two solutions on TU games with preference relations
Strategic advertising
Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games
Farsighted stability in average return games
Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods
Introducing “Cooperative Push”
Guarding the Guardians
Mistakes in Cooperation
Multilateral Contracting with Manipulation
The Last Will be First, and the First Last
Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma
Coalitions
A Model of Farsighted Voting
A Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Rationality and Stability in the Theory of Moves
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games
| Obras citantes distintas | 67 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,09 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 64 |