Guarding the Guardians
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9713299 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Bernardo Guimaraes (0000-0003-0098-2174, Sao Paulo School of Economics – FGV), Kevin D Sheedy (0000-0002-0247-6323, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 127 |
| Número | 606 |
| Páginas | 2441-2477 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12379 |
| OpenAlex | W2261147751 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 45 |
Good government requires some restraints on the powerful but how can those be imposed if there is no‐one above them? This article studies the equilibrium allocation of power and resources established by self‐interested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals’ rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time‐inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo and thus want to defend it
Business · Commit · Economic rent · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Power sharing · Rent-seeking · Status quo · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
The Origins of State Capacity
The injustice of inequality
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies
How Is Power Shared in Africa?
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Laws and authority
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy
Civil War
Unequal Societies
Rules Rather than Discretion
Anarchy and its Breakdown
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Constitutions and Commitment
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
Bargaining in Legislatures
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |