Talk May Be Cheap, but Deeds Seldom Cheat

On Political Liberalism and the Assurance Problem

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6231256
AutoresBernard Wong (0000-0003-0724-1635, Hong Kong Baptist University), Baldwin Wong (Hong Kong Baptist University), Man‐kong Li (Hang Seng University of Hong Kong), Chris Man-Kong Li (0000-0002-9286-8717, Hang Seng University of Hong Kong)
Año2024
Volumen68
Número4
Páginas1353-1365
Fecha de publicación2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12770
OpenAlexW4319792421
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas58

In a well‐ordered society, democratic officials face an assurance problem. They want to ensure that others will act reasonably when they do the same. According to political liberals, public reason can solve this problem, but the details of how assurance is generated are unclear. This article explains the assurance mechanism in political liberalism. Apart from public reason, mutual assurance is also provided by a long‐term record of civic deeds. By performing civic deeds over time, officials signal their reasonableness to each other. This record of civic deeds is costly to unreasonable officials and thus represents a reliable way to differentiate trustworthy fellows from others. The article also shows that a recent critique of political liberalism, which argues that public reason is merely cheap talk and thus political liberalism fails to provide mutual assurance, misses the point. It overlooks that assurance is created through talks and deeds together

Classical liberalism · Democracy · Face (sociological concept · Law and economics · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Social science · Sociology · Trustworthiness · Free Will and Agency · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Public Administration · Social Psychology