A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6232028
AutoresDavid Thunder (0000-0002-9836-6523, University of Notre Dame, autor de correspondencia)
Año2006
Volumen50
Número3
Páginas676-690
Fecha de publicación2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00209.x
OpenAlexW2035615534
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas22

In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so‐called “duty of civility” ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the “duty of civility,” which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole

Argument (complex analysis · Civility · Duty · Law and economics · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Underpinning · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification