Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries

The Case of the European Union

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6261973
AutoresMathias Czaika (0000-0002-6525-2714, University of Freiburg, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen10
Número1
Páginas89-113
Fecha de publicación2009-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Union Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1465-1165 • E-ISSN: 1741-2757
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1465116508099762
OpenAlexW2085465229
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13
Referencias citadas24

This article argues that cooperation to tackle the consequences of large asylum migration inflows is possible only among fairly symmetrical countries. Highly asymmetric countries have no incentives to join and remain in a stable coalition. The distinction between cost and spillover asymmetries shows that financial transfers may release constraints on participation, and thus make asylum cooperation feasible, only if they are focused on tackling this asymmetry. This result becomes relevant when applied to the context of the enlarged European Union. I argue that there is the potential for a future cooperative burden-sharing regime for asylum, particularly if unanimity is replaced by the double majority principle in European Council votes, as suggested in the EU reform treaty

Context (archaeology · Economics · European integration · European union · Incentive · International economics · International trade · Law and economics · Maastricht Treaty · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Spillover effect · Treaty · Unanimity · Economic Policies and Impacts · EU Law and Policy Analysis · European Union Policy and Governance · Law