Negotiating Education Reform

Teacher Evaluations and Incentives in Chile (1990–2010)

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6264010
AutoresAlejandra Mizala (0000-0002-1141-4677, University of Chile), Ben Ross Schneider (0000-0001-9227-7805, MIT)
Año2014
Volumen27
Número1
Páginas87-109
Fecha de publicación2014-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12020
OpenAlexW2115745018
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas18
Referencias citadas11

Reforms designed to improve the quality of teaching by reforming personnel practices, such as pay for performance arrangements, usually run into opposition from well‐organized teacher unions that can either block reform in the short run or undermine it over the longer term. The experience of a series of reforms that introduced collective and individual pay incentives for teachers in Chile from 1990 to 2010 provide a rare example of ongoing negotiation with the teacher union that resulted in an institutionalized structure of incentive pay for teachers as well as widespread attitudes of sustained support among teachers for performance pay. Chile offers an important example of how sustained change in incentive pay can be achieved through ongoing negotiation

Business · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Opposition (politics · Performance-related pay · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Education and Teacher Training · Educational Assessment and Improvement · Psychology · School Choice and Performance