Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets

Evidence from Venezuela

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284646
AutoresDorothy Kronick (0000-0001-9647-9842, University of Pennsylvania, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen64
Número7-8
Páginas1499-1523
Fecha de publicación2020-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002719898881
OpenAlexW4252732222
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20
Referencias citadas32

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years prior to this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets

Business · Criminology · Development economics · Drug trafficking · Economics · Empirical evidence · Sociology · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence