Walls and Strategic Innovation in Violent Conflict
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6284698 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Matthew Nanes (0000-0002-7006-5040, Department of Political Science, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA, autor de correspondencia), Trevor Bachus (Department of Political Science, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 65 |
| Número | 6 |
| Páginas | 1131-1158 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002721994667 |
| OpenAlex | W3036767862 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 30 |
Governments build walls to curtail a range of illicit activities like immigration, crime, and terrorism. We argue that while physical barriers effectively prevent specific unwanted behavior, they induce actors to respond strategically and develop new tactics, changing the nature of illicit activity and leading to new threats. We test this argument in the context of Israel’s security barrier. Using an instrumental variable unrelated to the underlying threat of attack, we analyze short-term changes in the barrier’s porousness. Terror attacks in Israel are less likely when the barrier is more secure. However, we also observe evidence of changing strategies. Attacks are most likely immediately after the government eases temporary restrictions on movement, suggesting that previously-planned attacks were delayed, not prevented. Furthermore, when the barrier is more secure, terrorists select weapons that are less affected by it and carry out attacks in systematically different locations. Ultimately, walls’ impacts on any challenge depend not just on how well they prevent movement but also on illicit actors’ strategic responses
Argument (complex analysis · Business · Computer security · Context (archaeology · Criminology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Social science history
Border Walls and Smuggling Spillovers
Barriers to Entry
Rebel Tactics
Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Counterterrorism
A Bayesian Poisson Vector Autoregression Model
Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability
Profits and Violence in Illegal Markets
What Do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has It Changed? Are We Safer
Do Walls Work? The Effectiveness of Border Barriers in Containing the Cross-Border Spread of Violent Militancy
Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence
Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks
Barriers to Trade
Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror
The Causes of Terrorism
Political Violence Cycles
A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Travel Restrictions in the West Bank
Sacred Time and Conflict Initiation
Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834
The quality of terrorist violence
Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources
The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies
Days of Action or Restraint? How the Islamic Calendar Impacts Violence
Terrorism and Voting
The Political Violence Cycle
Islamists and Nationalists
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |