Delegation and political turnover

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6298024
AutoresGreg Sasso (0000-0002-3953-6449, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen32
Número2
Páginas262-288
Fecha de publicación2020-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629819895596
OpenAlexW3000349421
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas31

We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent

Business · Compromise · Computer security · Corporate governance · Delegate · Delegation · Economics · Exploit · Incentive · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Public economics · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Finance