Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6299666
AutoresJinhee Jo (0000-0001-5685-3449, Kyung Hee University), David Primo (0000-0002-1888-6888, University of Rochester, autor de correspondencia), David M Primo (University of Rochester), Yoji Sekiya (independent scholar)
Año2017
Volumen29
Número1
Páginas124-148
Fecha de publicación2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629816630432
OpenAlexW2315456280
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas28

By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government, contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to insulate against worse outcomes in period two. By demonstrating how a simple set of changes to a workhorse model can change equilibrium outcomes significantly, this paper provides a foundation for reconsidering the static approach to studying political appointments

Bureaucracy · Divided government · Dynamics (music · Economics · Foundation (evidence · Government (linguistics · Gridlock · Ideal (ethics · Ideal point · Law and economics · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Public economics · Redistricting · Set (abstract data type · Simple (philosophy · Sociology · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy