Reflection and Responsibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6325433
AutoresPamela Hieronymi (0000-0002-7084-5581, University of California, Los Angeles, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen42
Número1
Páginas3-41
Fecha de publicación2014-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papa.12024
OpenAlexW2114851496
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas38
Referencias citadas20

paradigm cases, we act intentionally by first deciding what to do and then doing what we decided.We act, it seems, by being the cause of our own representations. 1 This "having in mind" involved in decision or intention provides, I believe, much of our sense of our control over our own actions.We control our actions, it seems, because, or insofar as, we can think about what to do and then do what we take to be worth doing.Our sense of control over our own actions thus involves both a certain kind of awareness-we have in mind what we intend to do -and a certain kind of voluntariness or discretion-we can decide to do whatever we think worth doing.It is very natural to think that this sort of control, the kind that, in its paradigm instances, involves both discretion and awareness, is not only a ground for but also a condition on our responsibility for our intentional actions: that we are responsible because we enjoy such control, and that, if we lack it, we cannot rightly be held responsible.However, if we start with the thought that, whenever we control a thing, we do so by reflecting upon that thing, deciding how it should be, and then bringing about that it is that way, we run into difficulties when we reflect upon our lives.It seems you should be able to reflect upon your life, decide how it should be, and then, with some effort and luck, bring it about that it is that way.However, when we reflect upon our lives, we might notice that each decision we make, and each thing we do, can be adequately explained by conditions in place prior to it.And so it might seem that we do not control our lives, after all: the future, it seems, will be explained by the past, and, since there is nothing we can do, now, to change the past, it seems there is nothing we can do, now, to change the future. 2And so, if we start with the thought that we control a thing by reflecting upon it, deciding how it should be, and then bringing it about that it is that way, reflection on the 2 1 In particular, by being the intentional cause of our own representations.The simpler formula is Kant on desire: "The faculty of desire is a being's faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations

Agency (philosophy · Conversation · Epistemology · Honor · Moral philosophy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Theology · Watson · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment