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Opting for the Best

Oughts and Options

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8069734
AutoresDouglas W Portmore (0000-0001-6180-457X, Arizona State University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Páginas336
Fecha de publicación2019-07-17
Open AccessNo
TipoBOOK
RevistaOpting for the Best (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780190945350.001.0001
OpenAlexW4232073446
Open LibraryOL28938696M
ISBN9780190945350
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas37
Referencias citadas58

The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on the following questions. What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of the goodness of the more encompassing options of which they’re a proper part? What do we hold fixed when assessing how good an option is? Do we, for instance, hold fixed the agent’s present beliefs, desires, and intentions? And do we hold fixed the agent’s predictable future misbehavior? The book argues that addressing these sorts of questions is the key to solving certain puzzles concerning what we ought to do, including those involving supererogation, indeterminate outcomes, overdetermined outcomes, and predictable future misbehavior. One of the book’s more controversial theses is that we have obligations not only to voluntarily perform certain actions, but also to nonvoluntarily form certain reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., desires, beliefs, and intentions). This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only on which acts the agent will simultaneously and subsequently be performing but also on which attitudes she will simultaneously and subsequently be forming

Economics · Keynesian economics · Opting out · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Choice (Psychology) · conduct of life · Decision making · Ethics · Values

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Obras citantes distintas37
Citas por año6,17
Intervalo de citas2020 - 2026 (7)
Velocidad de citacióncurrent
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 37
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